Wednesday, July 8, 2020

The clean water act Research Paper - 275 Words

The clean water act (Research Paper Sample) Content: Clean Water ActStudentà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬s NameUniversity AffiliationClean Water ActThis act is the main law governing water pollution in the United States. Its target is to regulate, reduce and eliminate the chemical, physical and by extension- the biological state of the water in the country (Act, 2008). This law averts and pollution by the government of treatment works and point pollution- and it is hoped that the management of wastewater contributes significantly to the actual cleanliness of national waters.The strategy employed in control and limitation of pollution of water revolves around various standards and measures as outlined. Point sources are not to discharge wastes (pollutants) without authority from the government environmental agencies for each state in the country. The standards used to quantify the point and the discharge are technologically based, limited by the application of the water quality analysis evaluation for acceptable water quality (Glicksman B atzel, 2010). The states in question are to liaise with the communities affected to classify the designated uses of the water à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬ and hence determine the allowable contents that can be disposed of into the water (Act, 2008). The chemical quantity, for example, would be used to decide of water is safe for farming.For non- point sources, pollutants involving agricultural storm water runoff are exempted from needing a permit, but with actual government support for control of the same. The industrial sources are however not excused, as the discharge from these sources can be controlled. Municipal runoff is however not defined, although it is excused- but it remains the responsibility of the governing body (Copeland, 2006). A financing program e...

Tuesday, May 19, 2020

Intensive Pronoun Definition and Examples

In  English grammar, an  intensive pronoun  is a  pronoun ending in -self or -selves that serve to emphasize its antecedent. They are also known as  intensive reflexive pronouns. Intensive pronouns often appear as appositives after nouns or other pronouns. Intensive pronouns have the same forms as reflexive pronouns: myself, ourselves, yourself, yourselves, himself, herself, itself, oneself, and themselves. Unlike reflexive pronouns, intensive pronouns are not essential to the basic meaning of a sentence. Examples and Observations I have never yet failed to meet a deadline I myself have set up.(Pat Schneider, Writing Alone and With Others. Oxford University Press, 2003)He wondered, as he had many times wondered before, whether he himself was a lunatic.(George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 1948)Janis Joplin was a name now associated with an image, one that had grown bigger than the woman​ herself.(Buzzy Jackson, A Bad Woman Feeling Good. Norton, 2005)Watching children make real progress in their language and literacy development is a reward with few rivals, especially because the children themselves greet their own accomplishments with such joy.(Katherine A. Beauchat et al, The Building Blocks of Preschool Success. Guilford Press, 2010)We ourselves feel that what we are doing is just a drop in the ocean. But the ocean would be less because of that missing drop.(Mother Teresa)It seems to me, that if you tried hard, you would in time find it possible to become what you yourself would approve.(Charlotte Bro ntà «, Jane Eyre, 1847)When you, our white countrymen, have attempted to do anything for us, it has generally been to deprive us of some right, power, or privilege, which you yourselves would die before you would submit to have taken from you.(Frederick Douglass)Not until the problem itself is clearly diagnosed can a solution be found.(Toby Dodge, Trying to Reconstitute the Iraqi State. Crescent of Crisis, ed. by Ivo Daalder et al. Brookings Institution Press, 2006)I found myself hoping that by the simple fact of extending some humanity towards poor old Ned, offering the unfortunate wretch some small degree of genuine understanding, that I myself had played some worthwhile role in this new and most welcome world of equanimity.(Patrick McCabe, Winterwood. Bloomsbury, 2006) The Difference Between Intensive and Reflexive Pronouns The contrast between reflexive and intensive pronouns is well illustrated with sit down, an intransitive verb that can also be used causatively, e.g. She sat the child down. It can be seen that John sat himself down is a reflexivised causative, whereas John himself sat down  and John sat down himself are intransitive, with an intensive pronoun that relates to the subject NP. Intensive pronouns are generally not placed in structural positions that could be filled by a reflexive pronoun. Watch is a transitive verb which can omit its subject--John watched Mary, John watched himself (on the video), John watched. In this case, an intensive pronoun from the subject NP (John himself watched) would not be likely to be moved to a position after the verb, since it could then be mistaken for a reflexive substitute for the object NP. However, an intensive pronoun could be moved after an explicit object NP (especially if there was a gender difference), e.g. John watched Mary himself. (Robert M. W. Dixon, A Semantic Approach to English Grammar. Oxford University Press, 2005)

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

Essay on The Role of Local Governments in the Global Economy

NOYO OSAGHAE 1/30/2012 I HAVE NEITHER GIVEN NOR RECEIVED, NOR HAVE I TOLERATED OTHERS’ OF UNAUTHORIZED AID THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN A GLOBALIZED ECONOMY Recent developments in the global economy would seem to suggest that it is in the interest of states to be integrated into the global economy, although it is also obvious that most would like to do so in the most beneficial and equitable ways. The increase in the number of states seeking membership in the World Trade Organization is perhaps evidence enough that states, whether developed or underdeveloped, democratic or non-democratic, want to play a role in the World Liberal Order. The circumstances under which states are influenced to be integrated into the global economy†¦show more content†¦According to her â€Å"While globalization gives rise to global cooperation, global local tensions surface as localities adapt to economic, technological and societal changes brought about by this process†. The method of adaption stated, is through the process of â€Å"Glocalization† which she defines as â€Å"a merging of global opportunities and local interests, aim ing to create a more socio-economically balanced world, which calls for the accommodation of global perspectives to local conditions, as well as for a more pronounced role of local actors addressing global challenges†. She further explains the function of Glocalization as â€Å"making cities key players in decentralized foreign policy, diplomacy, trade and inter-city projects forwarding social and economic development. This activity happens through the creation of coalitions where local governments serve as a balancing force to international private and public sector organizations in the framework of joint projects†. This viewpoint emphasizes the importance of the reform of globalization to be spearheaded by local leaders as they are more sensitive to social and cultural needs and closer in proximity to citizens than their national counterparts. The author analyzes these local responsesShow MoreRelatedLocal Economic Development For The City Of Johannesburg South Africa1428 Words   |  6 Pagesrecommendations for the local economic development for the city of Johannesburg South Africa. These recommendations are put forward to identify local strategies and actions that may be used to assist with the retention of workers within the South African economy, grow the work force and maximize opportunities for economic growth. . Local economic development involves identifying and utilizing local resources in creating opportunities for economic growth and employment. Successful local economic developmentRead MoreReforms : Addressing Economic Imbalances Essay1554 Words   |  7 Pagesvulnerabilities rising, successful development in the past relied on high investment, relatively inexpensive labor, productivity- enhancing foreign direct investment, and strong global demand. Along the way, the government played an important role in the allocation of resources, both through state-owned enterprises and local governments, especially in infrastructure. The moderation of China s growth has been structural, in part reflecting natural convergence as income per capita reached middle-income levelsRead MoreEssay about Module One Text Questions1 The financial889 Words   |  4 Pagesï » ¿Module One: Text Questions 1. The financial choices we make impact our economy. Think of a recent item you purchased. What factors influenced your decision in making this purchase? Did this purchase impact your local economy? Explain why or why not. A recent item I purchased was a Patte Kode yesterday with a few friends after a SGA meeting. The factors that influenced me to buy that item were my hunger, the near location of the Haitian establishment to my school, the price, and past experience ofRead MoreEconomy of Singapore 1077 Words   |  5 PagesIntroduction In this essay we look in-depth on how government strategies and economic policy play a crucial role in the success of High Performance Asian Economies (HPAEs) during 1960 to 1990 (World Bank 1993).There are eight countries within HPAEs: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Japan. Its economic development has significantly rise that it was name ‘East Asia Miracle’ (World Bank, 1993). Out of the eight country, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and SouthRead MoreEffectiveness of International Efforts to Ease Problem of Global Hunger1190 Words   |  5 PagesHow effective are the international efforts to ease the problem of global hunger? Global hunger, as its name suggests, is a global issue that requires the assistance and cooperation of countries, regardless of nationality, wealth or religion, so as to find an effective solution. Many policies and efforts, both international and national, have been done, or presently underway to reduce poverty, which causes hunger. The good cause behind these efforts cannot be denied, however, one may doubt if theRead MoreImpacts of Globilisation a Case Study of Australia1346 Words   |  6 PagesGlobilisation has both positive and negative impacts on the worlds population: Globilisation defined as a process of interaction and integration of the people, companies and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology. Globilisation affects countries economically, environmentally, politically, culturally and socially. Its affects have both positive and negative repercussions. The impact of Globilisation is passionatelyRead MoreImpact Of Trade Relations On International Trade1485 Words   |  6 PagesMost countries are dependant on international trade and the government plays a big role in this through forming their trade policy (Miller, 2010). In the past smaller countries have relied on trading with bigger nations, but in the mid-1960’s a lot of countries looked to pursue independence in their foreign policy. Even though we live in this new technological and global age, forming trade relations is vital to our economy. Every country has different trade policies which deter mine how trade occursRead MoreGlobalization in the Hospitality Industry1167 Words   |  5 Pagesare able to view attractions, dabble in local cuisine and experience life in a different country. Tourism is an industry that is rapidly growing as more and more people are traveling abroad. People have a genuine interest in learning about new cultures and experiencing all that a country has to offer. More countries are moving closer to globalization and this in turn is beginning to blend many cultures together. Developing countries are expanding their role in the tourism industry as countries areRead MoreInternational Educational Innovation And Revolution1023 Words   |  5 PagesThe world has completely come into a new â€Å"information society† and â€Å"knowledge economy† age at the beginning of the 21st century. In other words, Globalization has changed the basis of the world economy from industry to knowledge (David, E.Bloom,2004). Human resourses is playing a more significant role in self-development, companies and even countries than before. High quality of education, which is no longer the luxurious privilege for a handful of elite group people, has been considered as a basicRead MoreThe Diamond Model by Michael Porter1117 Words   |  5 Pageslack of consideration of the influence of the government and the role of chance in the nation. Some also critique on the inaptness of the framework to small economies, while others comment on the lack of historical perspective of the framework and lastly, the neglecting of national culture in the framework. Porter’s Diamond Model The Diamond Model (figure 1) outlines the ‘four broad attributes of a nation that shape the environment, in which local firms compete that promote or impede the creation

Fundamental of management Samples for Students †MyAssignmenthelp.com

Question: Discuss about the Fundamental of management. Answer: Clan culture and its relationship with the organizational structure It is observed that clan culture is a family-based corporate environment that insists on the consensus as well as commodity of values and gaols. Clan culture remains as most corporative and least competitive compared to other corporate culture (Kim and Hougyun 2016). The work environment is friendly and individuals have a lot of things in common. Thus, it is quite similar to a large family. The leaders and senior executives are considered as the mentors. The organization following clan culture is built with loyalty and tradition. As the major responsibilities, the companies tend to emphasizes long-term HR development. The major value drivers of clan culture are commitment, communication and development Gardner and Richard (2012). Likewise, the major theory of effectiveness of this culture is the development of human resource. In order to build an effective team, the employees are empowered with the authority to make decision. The leaders following the clan culture develop an open com munication, where the colleagues and co-worker could discuss their issues with the leaders. Figure 1: Organizational Culture (Source: Kim and Hougyun 2014) However, organization ns following the clan culture could suffer from the lack of diversity (Zahari, Ibrahim Bin, and Adel Mohamed Ali Shurbagi). A different thought is required to resolve the business problems but if all employees look at the same problem with same ideas, the solutions are less likely to discovered (Kim and Hougyun 2014). It is also observed that clan culture is effective in a small but an organization with a large structure and policies usually do not implement this culture. Nevertheless, employees who understand and embrace their workplace culture have better grasp of their objectives as well as they are more aware of their employee and customer needs (Ahmadi and Jamshid Akbari 2012). Explaining with the example One of the largest media and entertainment brands Vogue in Australia developed clan culture in its workplace. The brand is best known for its Vogue Magazine, which has gained worldwide popularity. The company has developed a friendly workplace culture, where the employees enjoy their work. Even though, the work culture in Vogue relies on employee empowerment, the senior leaders mostly take the large business decisions (Vague 2017). However, it is also identified that the company in foreign countries has different organizational culture, which is completely based on the usual structure of the corporate sector of the nation. For example, as the corporate environment in Singapore often relies on the hierarchical structure, the company develops its culture with increasing policies and rules instead of developing a friendly environment. In addition, as the clan culture has increasing level of internal focus, the maintenance of family based culture remains as the primary point, which often leads to delays as well as deficiencies. Recommendation The organization with large size and stricture could implement an adhocracy organizational culture instead of being relied on clan culture. The organizations in foreign countries have to deal with different corporate environment. Thus, Vogue could complement a culture that is globally acceptable. In such context, adhocracy organizational structure, the employees use their skills and talents to tackle the risk and the leaders focus on the innovation. In addition, the employees are engaged in decision-making, when the company needs to develop a large business solution. References "Vague". 2017.Vogue.Com.Au. https://www.vogue.com.au/. Ahmadi, Seyed Ali Akbar, Yashar Salamzadeh, Mohammadreza Daraei, and Jamshid Akbari. "Relationship between organizational culture and strategy implementation: typologies and dimensions."Global Business and Management Research4, no. 3/4 (2012): 286. Gardner, William L., Brian J. Reithel, Claudia C. Cogliser, Fred O. Walumbwa, and Richard T. Foley. "Matching personality and organizational culture: Effects of recruitment strategy and the Five-Factor Model on subjective personorganization fit."Management Communication Quarterly26, no. 4 (2012): 585-622. Kim, Hougyun. "Transformational leadership, organizational clan culture, organizational affective commitment, and organizational citizenship behavior: a case of South Korea's public sector."Public Organization Review14, no. 3 (2014): 397-417. Zahari, Ibrahim Bin, and Adel Mohamed Ali Shurbagi. "The effect of organizational culture and the relationship between transformational leadership and job satisfaction in petroleum sector of Libya."International Business Research5, no. 9 (2012): 89.

Wednesday, April 22, 2020

The Professors House Essays - The Professors House, Willa Cather

The Professor's House: A Loss of Identity In Willa Cather's The Professor's House, we see a changing persona in Godfrey St. Peter. Early in the story, St. Peter is a man continually looking and preparing for his future, a man who holds dear to his principles and ideals. The story concludes with an almost frail St. Peter, withdrawn from everything he deems important in his life. He abandons everything that has made him who he is and lives in the memory of his lost and "primitive" (Cather 241) youth. He longs for his Kansas boyhood when he truly lived as a boy more aware of the important things in life. It's an insight with reference to the intense memory of his fallen friend Tom Outland, who has become a symbol of St. Peter's lost youth. His growing distaste for society and how his family is caught up in its materialism makes him long for that world he believed to be pure and whole as a young Kansas boy (Hilgart 388). These intense emotions bring him to an indifference to life so great he is willing to accept death. Throughout the entire story, we see St. Peter growing more and more detached from his family. His manner at family dinner parties is mute and passive. Lillian, the professor's wife, has an acute awareness of St. Peter's changing manner yet cannot place it's cause. She lectures him and he gives her the excuse he is merely tired for never "slight [ing] anything" (Cather 143) in his life. St. Peter at this point knows this is a disguise for what he is truly feeling. His problem is the change he sees in his family. This change is mainly due to the introduction of his daughters' husbands, most notably Marsellus. Marsellus, Rosamond's husband, is perhaps the main culprit to this change. His money causes vanity in Rosamond, which in turn evokes jealousy in Kathleen, St. Peter's other daughter. We see the professor's perplexity at Lillian's change in attitude around Marsellus. She becomes caught up in his glitter and excess. Lillian is attracted to his vivacity and eagerness which is an almo st an exact contradiction to St. Peter's somber attitude. He remembers his daughters as innocent girls, untainted by the world, and a wife who responded to his youthful exhilaration as she does now to Marsellus. To St. Peter, an unfamiliar family is formed by this change and he, constrained by his values, does not change with them. His uncertainty of them is seen when he tells Lillian the story of Euripides going to live alone in a cave by the sea because his house had not agreed with him. St. Peter says to this, "I wonder whether it was because he (Euripides) had observed women so closely all his life" (Cather 136). The change in St. Peter's family is disappointing to him. He is a man with high expectations, morals, and a sense of what is good in people. We see his family betraying all these traits with their fondness for society's empty glamour. St. Peter remembers, with pleasure, his innocent girls wildly in love with Tom Outland and his stories of the Southwest. These memories bring an intense emotion of nostalgia for pure and wholesome days. Again, the professor's disappointment is seen over the sparring over the patent money. It is this money that has been the root of change St. Peter has begun to abhor. In addition, Tom Outland's memory has been tainted by this money. The professor believes the money is a smear on the pure and spotless story of Outland. He rejects this wealth because he will not participate in allowing his memory of Tom to be "translated into the vulgar tongue" (Cather 50). Cather portrays St. Peter as an individual set in his ways and not willing to change. It is this stubbornness which refuses to allow him to become like his family. He sees them as wrong because of their new attitude. St. Peter depicts his family's imperfection as being cause for his solitude. But it is St. Peter unwillingness to change and adapt that is the root of his problems. Lillian tells him this when she says, "One must go on living, Godfrey.

Monday, March 16, 2020

Israels Right to Self-Defense

Israels Right to Self-Defense Free Online Research Papers The present Article examines the legality of Israels military intervention in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 from a jus ad bellum perspective. More specifically, it examines whether Israel could lawfully invoke the right of self-defense, taking account of the factual circumstances, the justification given by Israel and the reaction of the international community. The Article focuses mainly on the controversy regarding the legality of self-defense against attacks by non-state actors. In this regard, it is noted that while the restrictions on this type of self-defense may have been eased in recent years, Israels intervention should not be considered a new precedent towards a broad right of self-defense against terrorist groups or other types of non-state actors. I. Introduction On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah militants attacked an Israeli military patrol, capturing two soldiers and killing three. Israel subsequently invoked the right of self-defense and engaged in military operations to retrieve the captured soldiers while carrying out air strikes against several targets in Lebanon, such as the Rafik Hariri International Airport in Beirut. The incident escalated in the following days, when aerial bombardments by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) were answered by a rainstorm of Katyusha rockets targeting Haifa and other cities in northern Israel. As the IDF crossed the Blue Line, the United Nations (U.N.)-monitored border demarcation between the two countries, Israeli troops and Hezbollah militants clashed in the worst fighting in southern Lebanon since 1982. For over a month the world held its breath until, finally, a frail ceasefire was put in place at the order of the U.N. Security Council on August 14, 2006. [FN1] In all, some 116 Israeli soldiers and 43 Isra eli civilians lost their lives between July 12, 2006 and August 14, 2006. On the Lebanese side, some 1,109 peoplemostly civilians were killed, as well as twenty-eight Lebanese soldiers. [FN2] Scores of people on both sides were injured or forced to flee their homes. The dramatic events of July and August 2006 raise important questions of jus ad bellum regarding the legality of self-defense in response to attacks by non-state actors. [FN3] Chief among these questions is whether state involvement in these attacks is needed to trigger Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, [FN4] which spells out the right of self-defense and, if so, what degree of state involvement is required. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has addressed this question in its advisory opinion on the legality of the â€Å"Palestinian Wall† [FN5] and in its judgment in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), [FN6] but it has been notoriously unable to provide a coherent answer to this polemic, to the discontent of some of its judges. Legal scholars are highly divided on the topic, although a growing number of authors have suggested that the legal restrictions on self-defense *267 ought to be eased. [FN7] States, on the other hand, do not seem to stumble over these thorny questions. Indeed, as they did in response to the 9/11 attacks, many states supported Israels self-defense claim without further ado, notwithstanding the fact that many were critical of the disproportionate character of Israeli attacks and the heavy loss of civilian life on the Lebanese side. Against this background, the present Article assesses the merits of Israels invocation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Given the fact that the initial attack emanated from Hezbollah and not from the Lebanese government, it is hard to fit Israels recourse to force into the traditional legal parameters of self-defense. We will therefore not only examine the legality of Israels actions but also their significance for the development of jus ad bellum, taking into account the reaction of the international community. I start from the widely accepted premise that custom, constituted of state practice and opinio iuris, is crucial for the determination of the scope of the legal prohibition on the use of force. [FN8] Thus, Israels state practice in the present case will be tested against the opinio iuris expressed by Israel, Lebanon and numerous other states in the debates of the U.N. Security Council. [FN9] In the end, while the *268 international community generally affirmed the applicabi lity of the right of self-defense to Israels actions, I argue that this should not be interpreted as creating a broad legal right to exercise self-defense against attacks by non-state actors. Rather, given the circumstances in Lebanon, Article 9 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Draft Articles) [FN10] may provide an alternative route to legally justify Israels recourse to self-defense under Article 51, while leaving in place the need for a certain degree of state involvement in armed attacks. The present analysis does not address the legality of Israels actions under international humanitarian law, [FN11] nor does it deal with the parallel military action in the Gaza strip during the same period. Part II summarizes the events of July 12, 2006 as well as the responses of Israel, Lebanon and the wider international community. Part III examines whether the conditions for the recourse to self-defense were met and focuses in particular on the question of whether and to what extent â€Å"armed attacks† require the involvement of a state to legally justify self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Part IV contains concluding remarks. II. The Outbreak of Hostilities and Reaction of the International Community On the morning of July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fighters attacked an Israeli border patrol between the towns of Zarit and Shtula. [FN12] Making use of a â€Å"dead zone† in the border fence, not visible from any of the IDF outlook posts, they crossed the border and ambushed an Israeli patrol with a combination of pre-positioned explosives and anti-tank missiles. Simultaneously, Hezbollah also launched a diversionary attack, firing Katyusha rockets and mortars at Israeli military positions and border villages. The latter attack wounded five civilians. In the ambush itself, three Israeli soldiers were killed, two were wounded and two were abducted. The IDF responded with artillery fire, air strikes, and a naval bombardment. Moreover, in its first military ground operation in *269 southern Lebanon since the withdrawal of Israeli troops in 2000, the IDF summoned a mission to rescue the captured soldiers and engaged in fierce fighting with Hezbollah gunmen. Shortly after the Zarit-Shtula incident, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made a statement in which he argued that the Hezbollah attack was â€Å"not a terrorist attack, but the action of a sovereign state that attacked Israel for no reason and without provocation.† [FN13] He pointed out that Hezbollah is a member of the Lebanese government, stressing that Lebanon was responsible for this â€Å"act of war . . . on the sovereign territory . . . of the state of Israel† and would bear the consequences of its actions. [FN14] In accordance with the reporting obligation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, Israel submitted a letter to the Security Council, stating that â€Å"[r]esponsibility for this belligerent act lies with the Government of Lebanon, from whose territory these acts have been launched into Israel. Responsibility also lies with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, which support and embrace those who carried out this at tack.† [FN15] The statement denounced the â€Å"ineptitude and inaction† of the Government of Lebanon to exercise its jurisdiction over its own territory, despite calls thereto in several Security Council resolutions. The statement goes on to reiterate that Israel â€Å"reserves the right to . . . exercise its right of self-defense when an armed attack is launched against a Member of the United Nations.† [FN16] To this end, it would take â€Å"appropriate actions to secure the release of the kidnapped soldiers and bring an end to the shelling that terrorize[d] [its] citizens.† [FN17] The next day, however, Lebanon called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the crisis. [FN18] Lebanon declared that it was â€Å"not aware of the events that occurred and are occurring on the international Lebanese border† and did not endorse them. [FN19] Lebanon refuted responsibility for the actions of Hezbollah and strongly condemned â€Å"the Israeli aggressions that targeted and are targeting the vital and civil Lebanese infrastructure.† [FN20] *270 Israels actions against Lebanon were only discussed in the margin during the Security Council meeting of July 13, 2006, which instead focused on the situation in the Gaza strip at the time (a draft resolution was defeated due to a United States veto). [FN21] However, the next day the Council did convene to discuss the Israeli-Lebanese situation. [FN22] During the debate it became clear that most of the fifteen Council members supported Israels invocation of self-defense in principlethe United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Slovakia, Greece, France, Peru, and Argentina all referred to Israels right of self-defenseeven though they refrained from speaking out on Lebanons possible responsibility for the Hezbollah attacks. Only China and Qatar identified Israels response as â€Å"armed aggression† against Lebanon. [FN23] On the other hand, most Council members also showed sympathy for the Lebanese authorities and stressed the need for the Lebanese government to ex ercise full control over all of its territory. Virtually all Council members expressed concern at the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure in Lebanon and called for restraint, with several countries, such as Russia and France, expressly condemning the disproportionate nature of Israels campaign. [FN24] In the following days, Israels claim continued to receive implicit and explicit support from several corners, although often in combination with deep concern at the loss of civilian life. Thus, on July 16, 2006, the Group of Eight (G8), meeting in St. Petersburg, issued a declaration acknowledging Israels right to self-defense while calling for restraint. [FN25] Two days later, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution â€Å"[c]ondemning Hezbollah and Hamas and their state sponsors and supporting Israels exercise of its right to self-defense.† [FN26] Likewise, Australian Prime Minister John Howard affirmed that Hezbollah had forced Israel into self-defense. [FN27] Even U.N. Secretary-General Annan, albeit highly critical of Israels excessive and disproportionate use of force, acknowledged Israels right to defend itself under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. [FN28] The open debate in the Security Council of July 21, 2006 shows a similar picture. Notwithstanding deep concern or outright condemnation of the disproportionate use of force, a majority of participants agreed as a matter of principle that Israel had the right to defend itself against the attacks by Hezbollah. [FN29] This position was held by the United States, the twenty-five *271 member states of the European Union, Japan, Russia, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Guatemala, and Ghana. On the other hand, the twenty-two member League of Arab States [FN30] condemned the Israeli aggression, as did China, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Other countries, such as India and Indonesia, condemned the disproportionate character of Israels action, without addressing the self-defense question. [FN31] Thus, it appears the international community steadily grew more critical of Israels use of force against Lebanon, especially after the killing of four U.N. peacekeepers in an Israeli artillery and aerial attack on July 25, 2006 [FN32] and the Qana massacre [FN33] of July 30, 2006 in which twenty-eight Lebanese civilians lost their lives. Still, a majority of states, including eleven out of fifteen Security Council members, backed the invocation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. [FN34] Let us now turn to the merits of the casus belli. A. Israels Self-defense Claim An examination of Israels self-defense claim can be broken down in three parts. First, we must establish whether the Zarit-Shtula incident qualifies as an â€Å"armed attack† in the sense of the U.N. Charters Article 51 ratione materiae. This means that we must assess whether Hezbollahs acts were â€Å"of such gravity† that they would qualify as an armed attack if they had been carried out by regular armed forces. Secondand this is the most difficult point to tackle from a legal perspectivewe must look into the Lebanese governments involvement in the activities of Hezbollah to verify whether the incident qualifies as an armed attack ratione personae. A third and final aspect concerns the necessity and proportionality of Israels response. A preliminary remark must be made. Several officials and media sources have questioned Israels motives in going to war against Lebanon. Some have suggested that Israel had long pre-planned its military campaign and was waiting to be provoked; others have pointed out that Israel pursued *272 wider goals than merely the return of its abducted soldiers. [FN35] Whether or not these suggestions are true is irrelevant from a jus ad bellum perspective. This follows from the Nicaragua case, where Nicaragua argued that the U.S. justification of self-defense merely served as a pretext for its contested activities. The Court rejected this argument, declaring that self-defense can be legally invoked if the appropriate conditions are met â€Å"even though there may be possibility of an additional motive, one perhaps even more decisive.† [FN36] Hence the answer: yes, self-defense may be a pretext, as long as the basic conditions are met. But were these conditions met on July 12, 2006? 1. Ratione Materiae Our first question concerns whether the â€Å"scale and effects† of the initial attack by Hezbollah were sufficient to trigger the right of self-defense. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ famously distinguished between the â€Å"most grave† forms of the use of force from other â€Å"less grave† forms. [FN37] Only the former qualify as â€Å"armed attacks† in the sense of Article 51. This is also evident from the ICJs reference to the Definition of Aggression, [FN38] adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1974, which the Court used as a yardstick to determine the existence of an armed attack. [FN39] Articles 2 and 3(g) of the Definition require that armed force be of sufficient gravity to constitute aggression. [FN40] As a result, a de minimis threshold has to be reached. An armed attack must involve at least a use of force producing (or liable to produce) serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions, human casualties or considerable destruction of property. [FN41] Use of force below this threshold may well trigger a states right to take countermeasures, but it does not justify recourse to self-defense. On the other hand, a single incident such as the mining of a single vessel may be sufficient to bring into play the inherent right of self-defense. [FN42] Single incidents may also be â€Å"accumulated† so as to determine whether the threshold has been reached. [FN43] In Nicaragua, the ICJ excluded â€Å"mere frontier incidents† from the concept of â€Å"armed attack.† [FN44] Many scholars criticized this distinction as *273 artificial, arguing that some â€Å"frontier incidents† may be trivial, while others may be extremely grave. [FN45] However, the concept of frontier incidents may be useful to avoid escalation of minor incidents. It does not a priori rule out the possibility that trans-border incursions could singly or collectively amount to armed attacks. The ICJ did not provide much guidance to distinguish mere frontier incidents from armed attacks, but only referred in general terms to â€Å"scale and effects† and circumstances and motivations. [FN46] The implication seems to be, as Gray notes, that â€Å"the Court would include within ‘frontier incident’ episodes where there was no intent to carry out an armed attack, including accidental incursions and incidents where officials disobeyed orders.â €  [FN47] Given this understanding, the premeditated and well-organized character of the Hezbollah ambush, the ongoing nature of the abduction, combined with diversionary rocket attacks suggest that this was a deliberate â€Å"armed attack† rather than a mere â€Å"incident.† Considering the serious consequences of the attackwhich included territorial intrusions, human casualties, and destruction of propertyone could argue that, even though it was a relatively small-scale event, the ratione materiae criterion was fulfilled. The outcome of this analysis would be different if one were to follow the alternate version of the incident, proclaimed by the Lebanese police and later by Hezbollah. According to this version, the Israeli soldiers were captured when Hezbollah attacked an Israeli commando force trying to infiltrate the village of Ayta ash-Shab, well inside Lebanese territory. [FN48] This account seems somewhat at odds with the apparently premeditated nature of Hezbollahs attac k. [FN49] All major news agencies, including Al Jazeera, as well as the European Union and the G8, have characterized the abduction as a â€Å"cross-border† attack. Likewise, the report of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) states that Hezbollah â€Å"crossed the Blue Line into Israel and attacked an IDF patrol,† [FN50] and Security Council Resolution 1701 speaks of â€Å"Hezbollahs attack on Israel.† [FN51] Therefore, we see that the answer to the question posed at the start of this section is that the attack by Hezbollah was sufficient to trigger the right to self-defense. *274 2. Ratione Personae The ratione personae aspect is more difficult to assess. The problem is that considerable controversy exists as to when attacks carried out by non-state actors qualify as â€Å"armed attacks† in the sense of Article 51. The text of the Article does not explicitly restrict the scope of â€Å"armed attacks† to acts of state agents, yet it has traditionally been interpreted in this way. [FN52] Thus, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee long ago declared that â€Å"the words ‘armed attack’ clearly do not mean an incident created by an irresponsible group of individuals, but rather an attack by one state upon another.† [FN53] On the other hand, literature also suggests that self-defense can be exercised against attacks by non-state actors when there is a certain degree of state involvement in the attacks, a situation which is sometimes labeled â€Å"indirect military aggression.† [FN54] In addressing this controversy, the International Court of Justice has applied the reasoning of Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression, which was taken to reflect customary international law. Thus, the Court extended the notion of â€Å"armed attack† to â€Å"the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its substantial involvement therein.† [FN55] Nevertheless, the application and interpretation of this phrase has become increasingly contested. This is a consequence of evolutions in state practice, recent resolutions adopted by the Security Council, and, last but not least, subsequent ICJ jurisprudence. As a result, there are currently three broad lines of reasoning. [FN56] On the one hand, some argue that self-defense can only be exercised when attacks by non-state actors can be imputed to a State in accordance with established rules on state responsibility. On the other extreme, some argue that state involvement has become irrelevant and that one should only look at the gravity of the attack to determine the appropriateness of self-defense. In between, a third position claims that state involvement remains a precondition albeit under a lower threshold than that of state responsibility. Hereafter, we will examine these positions in the context of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. It is argued that Israels actions fail to meet th e ratione personae threshold, not only if one sticks to the general rules on state *275 responsibility, but also when a somewhat lower state involvement standard is adopted. Subsequently, an alternative route is suggested to act against states failing to prevent cross-border attacks by non-state actors by falling back on a somewhat neglected rule of state responsibility, dealing with conduct carried out in the absence or default of official authorities. i. State responsibility As mentioned above, the ICJ in the Nicaragua case used Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression as a yardstick for the legality of self-defense against attacks by non-state actors. This article refers to the â€Å"sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State . . . or its substantial involvement therein.† [FN57] Although the wording â€Å"sending by or on behalf of† seems to imply agency, the additional reference to â€Å"substantial involvement therein† suggests that this yardstickwhich the Court held to be part of the primary rules of the jus ad bellumis not necessarily identical to the secondary rules concerning state responsibility, but may actually be broader. Indeed, the phrase â€Å"substantial involvement† was the result of long debates regarding the degree of state involvement needed to establish â€Å"aggression.† [FN58] Some delegations w anted to include â€Å"support,† â€Å"acquiescence,† and â€Å"encouragement of organization† of armed bands. Others wanted to reserve â€Å"aggression† to cases of â€Å"open and active participation.† [FN59] The implication of the Courts reference to Article 3(g) therefore seems to be that self-defense may go beyond situations where attacks by non-state actors are imputable to a state and also covers situations where a state is â€Å"substantially involved† in their activities. At the same time, however, the ICJ took a narrow view of such involvement and discarded the idea that â€Å"the provision of weapons or logistical or other support† could amount to an armed attack. [FN60] Although the giving of sanctuary to non-state actors did not arise on the facts in Nicaragua, it is assumed that the Court implicitly rejected that acquiescence or the inability to control armed bands operating on a states territory could constitute an arme d attack. [FN61] In the end, the Courts narrow interpretation seemed to de facto limit self-defense to attacks that are actually attributable to states. This position was heavily attacked by Judge Schwebel and Judge Jennings as well as by several scholars. Judge Jennings, for example, pointed out that, â€Å"it becomes difficult to understand what it is, short of direct attack by a states own forces, that may not be done apparently without a lawful response in the form of . . . self-defence.† [FN62] *276 If ever there was a gap between the Courts interpretation of Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression and the rules on state responsibility, it seems to have been closed in two recent ICJ cases. Thus, in the Palestinian Wall advisory opinion, the Court stated that Article 51 U.N. Charter recognized, â€Å"the existence of an inherent right of self-defense in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.† [FN63] Since Israel had not claimed that the attacks it suffered were in fact â€Å"imputable to a foreign state,† the right of self-defense could not be invoked to justify the building of the â€Å"Palestinian Wall.† [FN64] And in DRC v. Uganda, the Court invoked the wording of Article 3(g) Definition of Aggression, albeit dropping the reference to â€Å"substantial involvement.† [FN65] The Court seemed to follow the view that the deplorable attacks against Uganda by armed groups acting from Congolese territory were due to the Demo cratic Republic of the Congos (DRC) inability to control events along its border and concluded that the attacks were â€Å"not attributable† to the DRC. Given the absence of state responsibility, the preconditions for the exercise of self-defense were deemed absent, meaning that the Court â€Å"did not need to enquire† whether Ugandas actions had abided by the standards of proportionality and necessity. Given the jurisprudence of the ICJ, it is little wonder that Israel traveled the road least contested and invoked state responsibility. Indeed, while reporting to the Security Council, Israel took the position that Lebanon was responsible for Hezbollahs attack and that, as a result, this was not a terrorist attack, but rather the action of a sovereign state. [FN66] If this were true, then there would be no doubt that Israel could lawfully invoke Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. However, one would first need to demonstrate that Hezbollahs actions could be attributed to the Lebanese government in accordance with the stringent rules on state responsibility, enshrined in the International Law Commissions authoritative Draft Articles on State Responsibility. [FN67] In principle, Draft Article 4 limits state responsibility to acts carried out by state organs exercising legislative, executive, judicial or other functions, as long as they are acting in their official capacity. [FN68] Draft Article 7 makes clear that this also covers occasions where agents exceed their authority or contravene their instructions. In this context, Israel emphasized the fact that Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government. [FN69] Hezbollah has indeed participated as a political party in Lebanese elections since 1992 and at the time of the crisis it held fourteen seats in the 128-member Parliament. It was, *277 moreover, a minority partner in the Cabinet, where it held two minister posts (Energy and Water, and Labour). It had also endorsed a third Cabinet position, namely that of Fawzi Salloukh, minister for Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, to conclude from this participation that the July 12 attack was carried out by state agents is not acceptable. The mere fact that Hezbollah held two minister posts obviously does not imply that all Hezbollah militants would become state agents. This might be different if Hezbollah were leading the government, as Hamas did at the time in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In such a situation, one could argue that the military wing of Hezbollah would become an extension of the governments security apparatus, implying that its actions would be imputable in the sense of Draft Article 4. Yet, in the present context, Draft Article 4 does not apply. This means that we have to look at the exceptions to the rule that states are only responsible for acts of their organs. Three main exceptions exist. The first two are laid down in Draft Article 8, according to which the conduct of a person or a group of persons shall be considered an act of a state if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the specific instructions of the state or is under the direction or control of the state in carrying out the conduct. [FN70] With regard to the latter exception, the ICJ suggested that the litmus test is the existence of â€Å"effective† control or direction. [FN71] The third exception deals with situations where a state explicitly acknowledges and adopts conduct by non-state actors as its own (Draft Article 11; both requirements have to be fulfilled cumulatively). This situation surfaced in the Tehran case where the ICJ held that the Iranian policy of placing pressure upon the United States by not ending the hostage-crisis in the U.S. embassy and various Iranian authorities compliance with this policy transformed the occupation of the U.S. embassy into acts of Iran. [FN72] None of these exceptions apply in the present situation. As the Secretary-General remarked, it was clear that the Lebanese government had no advanced knowledge of the attack. [FN73] The Lebanese government immediately distanced itself from Hezbollahs attack and informed the Security Council that it was not aware of the events and did not endorse them. [FN74] Moreover, whereas Israel accused Iran and Syria of â€Å"supporting and embracing† those who carried out the attack, it did not accuse Lebanon of supporting Hezbollah, let alone of â€Å"effectively controlling† Hezbollah. Instead, Israel merely spoke of Lebanons â€Å"ineptitude and inaction† in exercising jurisdiction over its own territory, blaming the government for not implementing Security Council Resolution *278 1559. [FN75] The latter resolution had called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon as well as the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. [FN76] I t had partially been implemented as a result of the withdrawal of most Syrian forces from Lebanese territory. [FN77] However, the Lebanese government had failed to dismantle Hezbollah, thus allowing the country to become a â€Å"hotbed of violence and a cesspool of terrorism.† [FN78] Israel argued that it was compelled to act â€Å"not against Lebanon, but against the monster that Lebanon had allowed to hold it hostage.† [FN79] Like virtually all U.N. Members during the Security Council debates of July 14 and 31, Israel supported the position that the Lebanese government should extend its sovereign jurisdiction over the whole of its territory, a position that formed the basis for Resolution 1701. [FN80] In other words, the Lebanese government was not seen as the problem, but as part of the solution. Now that we have established that the July 12 attack was not imputable to the Lebanese government in the sense of Draft Articles 4, 8 or 11, does this mean that self-defense was excluded in the present context? If one adheres to the proposition that the exercise of self-defense against attacks by non-state actors requires state responsibility, the answer would at first sight be affirmative. However, the latter position is increasingly criticized for rendering self-defense against attacks by non-state actors virtually always impossible. [FN81] First, it is highly unlikely that a state would explicitly acknowledge an attack and adopt it as its own in the sense of Draft Article 11, knowing that doing so would make it the possible target of a counterattack. Second, in most situations of alleged â€Å"indirect military aggression,† states are involved by indirectly providing assistance, training, financial and logistical support, rather than by giving specific instructions or exerc ising effective control over attacks. In such circumstances, a state sponsor commits an internationally wrongful act. For example, the Declaration on Friendly Relations proclaims that â€Å"no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state.† [FN82] Nonetheless, the state victim of an attack by non-state actors would only be allowed to resort to peaceful countermeasures. The state supporting the attack would effectively be shielded from the use of military force. *279 In an age where terrorism is universally recognized as one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, [FN83] a strict insistence on the need for state responsibility seems untenable. Such a position has also been challenged by several judges of the ICJ. In relation to the Palestinian Wall advisory opinion, for example, Judge Kooijmans, Judge Buergenthal, and Judge Higgins all emphasized that nothing in the text of Article 51 stipulates that self-defense is available only when an armed attack is made by a state. [FN84] Both Judge Kooijmans and Judge Buergenthal suggested that Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 marked a new approach to self-defense, regretting that the Court had by-passed these new elements. [FN85] Judge Higgins has written separately to reiterate her earlier criticism of the Courts reliance on the Definition of Aggression in the context of the Nicaragua case. [FN86] Criticism had grown stronger by the time of the DRC v. Uganda case, where the role of irregular forces was at the heart of the dispute. Several judges regretted that the Court had not taken the opportunity â€Å"to clarify the state of the law on a highly controversial matter, marked by great controversy and confusionnot the least because it was the Court itself that ha[d] substantially contributed to this confusion by its Nicaragua judgment. . . .† [FN87] Judge Kooijmans and Judge Simma were mainly concerned with a phenomenon â€Å"which in present-day international relations has unfortunately become as familiar as terrorism,† namely the almost complete absence of government authority in the whole or part of the territory of a state. [FN88] Both suggested that in such circumstances one should only look at the scale and effects of an attack to determine the applicability of Article 51. Judge Koroma, on the other hand, argued that a states â€Å"massive support for arme d groups, including deliberately allowing them access to its territory† could be characterized as an â€Å"armed attack.† [FN89] Finally, Judge ad hoc Kateka rejected the idea that â€Å"the provision of arms, coupled with ‘logistical and other support†Ã¢â‚¬â„¢ could not qualify as an armed attack. [FN90] These separate and dissenting opinions acquire a particular meaning if we look at recent evolutions in state practice and opinio iuris. Here we notice a trend of abandoning the need for state imputability in two different scenarios, namely cases where a state supports the activities of non-state actors and cases where a state is unable to prevent non-state actors from carrying out attacks. Research Papers on Israel's Right to Self-DefenseTwilight of the UAWCanaanite Influence on the Early Israelite ReligionUnreasonable Searches and SeizuresPETSTEL analysis of IndiaHonest Iagos Truth through DeceptionNever Been Kicked Out of a Place This NiceMarketing of Lifeboy Soap A Unilever ProductCapital PunishmentThe Effects of Illegal ImmigrationThree Concepts of Psychodynamic

Saturday, February 29, 2020

Analysis of the Film Psycho

The movie Psycho is a story about a woman named Jaine Leigh named Marion Crane. The movie starts with a bedroom scene where Marion starts talking about her future with her lover Sam. After a short encounter with Sam, she returned to work and was exposed to $ 40,000 in cash. With such huge money, Marion ran away with money; this meant that she wanted to run away with Sam and they could start again. Along the way, she stopped at the motel, became the site of her murder, and is about to explore more sites. Alfred Hitchcock writes a journal article on the analysis of movie 'psychology'. This is argued as one of the great pictures as one of the psycho film's attractions. I will explain the specific technique Hitchcock used to give the audience a sense of tension and create a suspense. With low budget, very basic special effects, black and white photography, Alfred Hitchcock 's psychology still overcome pending issues and competed with today' s big hit. For many years many people have begu n to believe that despite myriad scientific research, psychodynamic concepts and treatments are not as effective as other treatments. However, in Shedler (2010), as the misunderstanding of the concept of psychodynamics and the ineffectiveness of treatment was retirement of a graduate medical institution to train non-doctors and non-doctors, mainly due to dislike of mental health professionals I assert that. Take a disqualified position Alfred Hitchcock 's psychology directed movie analysis psychology (1960) is based on Robert Bloch novel of the same name. The film is overseen by Hollywood legend Alfred Hitchcock. The script is written by Joseph Stephano and is based on real crime of serial killer Ed Gein. Movie stars Janet Rey, Anthony Perkins, John Gavin and Vera Meyers. This film has been nominated for four academic awards and is widely recognized as one of Hitchcock's best films. It produced two sequels, Psycho by Alfred Hitchcock. One of the operational themes presented to audie nces at Psycho is the opposite of good and evil. This can be seen in various roles through movies. You can also get an example from a conflict in a role. Some contradictions, how the characters deal with them, and how each other shapes the structure of the movie. The concept of characters that audiences receive depends on various people throughout the film.